• Oleksandr Andrieiev's avatar
    [CR2390] Identity spoofing/privelege escalation · bc8c9fdc
    Oleksandr Andrieiev authored
    For secure connections that use certificates the SubjectUUID
    is retrieved from leaf certificate's CN. However, there is
    no binding mechanism between Root CA and Device Id that it
    can generate certificates for. Root CAs can issue certificates
    with arbitrary UUIDs, which can be used to impersonate another
    Device.
    
    The fix adds callback to the certificate chain validation
    function. This callback collects single-linked list of all
    UUIDs associated with the certificate in cred entries.
    When leaf certificate is reached, UUID of Device is retrieved
    and matched against static list. If no matching UUID is
    found, connection should be rejected.
    
    Bug: https://jira.iotivity.org/browse/IOT-3087
    Change-Id: I20333c980226dc6a0c257dc36aab1502202993d9
    Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrieiev's avatarOleksandr Andrieiev <o.andrieiev@samsung.com>
    bc8c9fdc
ca_adapter_net_ssl.c 97.9 KB